

THE PLAIN VIEW

OCTOBER 1947

Marx and the Marxists

JOHN KATZ

Recent Impressions of the Near East

PRYNS HOPKINS

Women of the Middle East

NINA SPILLER

Commentary, Book Reviews and Correspondence

QUARTERLY • ONE SHILLING



THE PLAIN VIEW

A HUMANIST JOURNAL CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RELATIONS AND WITH
THE QUALITY OF LIVING

Οὐδεν ἱκανον ὡ ὀλιγον το ἱκανον

—EPICURUS

Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems little

UBERTATES ET COPIAE VIRTUTIS

—CICERO

the productiveness and the resources of human quality

THIS IS THAT WHICH WILL INDEED DIGNIFY AND EXALT KNOWLEDGE, IF
CONTEMPLATION AND ACTION MAY BE MORE NEARLY AND STRAITLY
CONJOINED AND UNITED TOGETHER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN; A
CONJUNCTION LIKE UNTO THAT OF THE TWO HIGHEST PLANETS, SATURN
THE PLANET OF REST AND CONTEMPLATION, AND JUPITER, THE PLANET
OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACTION.

—BACON

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COMMENTARY

NATIONAL DISCIPLINE. The economic crisis presents on a national scale to the collective people the situation, sufficiently familiar in private life, of living beyond one's income. The prison and the workhouse were the penalties society ultimately imposed upon this way of life. The nation is threatened with a desperate shortage of necessities and the consequent breakdown of society as a going concern: the penalties in prospect are alarming in possibility and unforeseeable in detail. Both the gravity and the obscurity of the warnings which Ministers repeatedly utter are all too well justified; and the alarm and irritation of the response, mirrored in the Press, proceed from the same cause.

Broadly, the industrial incentive has always been to work in order not to want, but there have been differences which have made all the difference in the operation of the incentive; differences, that is, in those who have had to do the working or the wanting. In the system of laissez-faire economics, the employers had to keep themselves in business by satisfying the market, and could be trusted to keep their employees up to the mark by the threat of want. Complacency about the long-term efficiency of this system was blasted by the experience of persistent under-consumption associated with large-scale permanent unemployment; with the result that a policy of full employment and social security has become recognized as the essential condition of a stable modern industrial society. The fear of unemployment, a spur to efficiency, is to be done away with; at the same time, restrictions, controls, directives, the allocation of supplies and of markets (all of a stringency greatly increased by the shortages and changes brought about by the war) drastically reduce the opportunities of employers to make their businesses more profitable. The new security for the many is threatened by the danger of impaired efficiency in total productivity. Whereas formerly the national income was secured by leaving each to his efforts to secure his own, now each is secured his own and all are asked to make appropriate efforts to secure the national income. This has been made familiar enough by now. But the change goes far beyond the crisis and is of the first importance to all of us, and it demands changes in habits of thought and in social techniques (amounting to a new social discipline) which have not yet been fully and widely accepted.

There are three obvious elements in the new discipline upon which to concentrate attention. (1) Essential work has to be made attractive. It is no longer true that workers will come for higher wages, as they once left the land to go into the mines. They must be offered good conditions, and the most compelling part of good

conditions is the appeal to the worker's spirit, the part he is allowed to play in understanding and running the concern: it is the ethos of an employment, ultimately the ethics of the employment, that attracts. (2) The social pressure of public opinion grounded in the facts of the new situation must mould the conscience. The stigma which formerly attached to debt and destitution must be attached to productive inefficiency wherever it is found. Great Britain ought to be socially mature enough to do what is necessary without resort to tiresome propaganda and enthusiasm-fetching stunts. But the new response which is necessary is not to be had merely by asking for it. The Government is constantly blamed for not having put over the case to the public, bringing home to the consciousness of the individual citizen what is wanted of him. Perhaps the Government's most grievous failure is in this field. But that is solely because the proper agencies, who alone can do the job, are not yet equipped and prepared to do it. The Government can take only rough and ready emergency measures, like the application of stimulants in a critical condition of the body. Its own proper part is in intimate collaboration with the many trade and professional organizations to whom alone belong the power and the duty to transform the habits and the approach which sustain the economic life of the nation. For what is to be demanded of each cannot be an absolute: it is inseparably bound up with the adjustment of interests. Therefore it is the work of the organized interests. (3) The organized interests are organized to press their claims and to safeguard their gains; they have to temper such purposes by the inclusion of recognized responsibility for helping to shape and to implement public policies mainly determined by national factors and agreed social principles, and for bringing home to their constituents an understanding acceptance of what is wanted of them and what has been pledged for them. There is encouraging evidence of the extent to which trade unions and professional organizations (e.g., scientists, farmers, and, most recently, journalists) recognize and accept their new responsibility; but their officials, especially in the large trade unions, are too harassed by daily calls and the pressure of traditional business to give the time, study, and thought exacted by the creative work to which they are now called. Under the pressure of national emergency, and with confidence in a Labour government, the present danger, grimly underlined at Grimethorpe, is that trade union officials shall be too eager to take on their new responsibility and abandon their indispensable function of representing stubborn interests. It is no use dealing with such large-scale workers' recalcitrance by disciplinary action or threats. The business of their union leaders has been to represent them not to commit them; and equally it is going to be the business of their

leaders to induce them to recognize that what is asked of them is reasonable and on a footing with what is asked of everyone else. That is where the Government comes in. If you abandon open competition (which is soon organized on lines of class struggle), you can't halt short of full partnership in an accepted common pattern of interdependent interests. That has to be created empirically, and the main agents in doing it are the trade unions and professional organizations working with a popularly elected government. But they have no chance of doing it unless there is fairly general understanding of the necessities of the case and the end in view. Writers in the general press would serve the nation and earn their bread if they could concentrate on their part in elucidating for their readers the process of this social progress towards intimate national collaboration.

HOLIDAY THEME. The Government has perhaps some reason to be thankful to Mr. Butlin, M.B.E., although it may be suspected that holidays with pay for millions appeals to the imagination of some of our political organizers. National parks make an old-fashioned shrunken ministerial project when there are culture parks or holiday parks to be had. What, as a matter of fact, do people of various classes, occupations, types, do with their holidays, and with what consequences? A rewarding study for thesis-hungry graduates. And when the people's holidays have been exhaustively researched and administratively regularized, it will remain a tempting theme for idle thoughts.

Idleness is itself a drop of the essence of holidaying: ceasing to do, ceasing to be, walking out of accustomed responsibilities and routines—vacation. Change of scene, of régime, of occupation; rest, health, pleasures: such are the indications, positive as well as negative, of the expressible needs which crave satisfaction in holidays. The details are determined by circumstances and personal preference.

It is not so simple. Which of us really takes when he can the holiday he really needs or wants? The inside story of boredom, irritation, frustration, repressed and hidden from the sufferer or expressed in bickering, indigestion, distractions, stimulants, or amours, is perhaps a truer account of holiday-making than appears in the popular press. The wage-earner spends a good lump of his annual reward on this poison which is to be the source of spiritual and physical renewal which will set him up for the labours of another year. But let him take with both hands his relaxation and liberty, and, all ungirt, without rule, regulation, or necessity, he is lucky if it does not come to worse than the same thing, and he is a burden to himself without grievance. We are childish on holiday,

but not children enough. It is the supreme irony of this ironical business that children, who have no adult need of holidays, are the supreme holiday-makers. The great excitements, the ever memorable holidays, are those of our youth. Such ecstasy, like more durable happiness, is not in the prescription. There is no need of an express formulation of the above considerations to set people murmuring: "Butlin is good for us, Butlin is best." A pity, because holidays offer such careless rapture inaccessible at other times. But to get it is an exacting business. We can't reasonably expect to do better with our holidays than we do with our lives; and most commonly we do a lot worse.

When we fail in spirit and intelligence, we fall back on techniques; never, anyhow, to be despised. There are many useful techniques employable in holiday-making. You may find the charm of a holiday in the invariability of a new routine, or in a violence of contrast with your accustomed manner of life, or in a succession of contrasts between the spending of one day and another or of parts of the day. There may be some pattern of pure activity (accomplishment of something within a day), or of pure passivity (having the day accomplish itself over one's head); or some contrast or combination of the two. Here are abstract patterns, teasing or soothing, with which to play about, realizing them now in this way, now in that. Choose pure passivity, for example: passivity it must be, without any ripple of aim, wish, or thought that puts one back into the world of striving and desiring, passivity of the spectator rooted to one place, whether standing in the street, lying on the beach or a mountainside or in a meadow or orchard, or staying in bed; detachment, having no part in what goes on but feeling it pass, the episodes and the vacancy, the press and the hush, feeling the stealth of the gentle movement over one's senses of the seasonal rhythm which carries the flux of events. Choose pure activity . . . But the theme is inexhaustible; spoils for the administrator, and the researcher, and the idler.

MARX AND THE MARXISTS

[We are grateful to the Porcupine Press, Ltd., for permission to print the greater part of a chapter from a new book by John Katz, "The Five Acts of History," which the publisher has announced for early publication.]

The Prophet Without Honour

IN 1948 we shall be celebrating the centenary of the Communist Manifesto, and in 1947 the thirtieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Seventy years separate these two momentous events. To-day it is not difficult for the historian, functioning as a scientific sociologist, to discover in the first of these events the prophecy and

the part-cause of the second. But the year 1848, when there were revolutionary outbreaks in Berlin, Vienna, and Naples, as well as in Paris, marks the close of the reaction against the ideas of the French Revolution—a reaction which was the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. Between the French Revolution in 1789 and the return of revolutionary ferment in 1848, the bourgeois opponents of the absolutist princes of Europe had employed the interval in forging new weapons. The bourgeoisie had become industrialist. The railway, the steamship, the factory, made the industrialist bourgeoisie more formidable opponents than the lawyers, farmers, merchants, and business men that had made the earlier revolutions of 1688 in England, of 1776 in America, and of 1789 in France.

Only three years after 1848, the Great Exhibition, sponsored by the Prince Consort, sang a hymn of praise, celebrating triumphantly the creative achievements of the new industrial capitalists. And yet in 1848, Marx and Engels, two obscure middle-class intellectuals, who had left their German homeland when it was as yet hardly touched by the Industrial Revolution and when it was still dreaming of a man of blood and iron who, by reducing the number of Germany's absolutist princelings, would change her into a centralized modern state, Marx and Engels visit Paris and Brussels and London, the Babylons of the new capitalism, and proclaim that capitalism is already condemned by its inherent contradictions, and that the capitalists are destined to be replaced by the new class that capitalism has engendered—the proletariat.

What is at first sight surprising about the doctrine of the economic interpretation of history, one of the principal planks of Marxism, is that a German, at such an early moment in the evolution of industrial capitalism, should have promulgated it. Hegel's metaphysical interpretation of history—human history in its cosmic setting—was in tune with Germany's Romantic Movement, and her political and economic backwardness. As Heine, the German-Jewish poet living in Paris, told the Germans in 1844:

“The land belongs to the Russian and French,
The English own the sea,
But we in the airy realm of dreams
Hold sovereign mastery.”

At a time when your neighbours are making history by taking possession of the globe, it is consoling to know that from the perspective of eternity, history does not need to be made, seeing that it is made already.

There is no mystery about the authorship of the Communist Manifesto. But supposing the authorship were not known, we may

be sure that some unraveller of historical anonymity would have ascribed it to an Englishman, writing in the "Hungry Forties" of the nineteenth century. He would have argued that such a protest against the degradation of the working classes, reduced by the new machines to the sub-human level of proletarians, could have come only from an Englishman. We may also be sure that the authorship would have been claimed for a Frenchman. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle." This proposition, it would have been argued, was part of a theory of history which could have come only from a Frenchman caught in the torrent of social speculation released by the French Revolution. The torrent had so quickened the mind of the new French intelligentsia that Socialism and sociology had been conceived. Comte, the father of the new science of sociology, had informed the world, at least two decades before 1848, that he had discovered the laws of historical change. Comte claimed that his Law of the Three Stages explained scientifically the progress of society from primitive savagery to the industrial civilization of his own day. The author of the Communist Manifesto must therefore have been a Frenchman with his mind steeped in the Comtist school of scientific sociology.

The truth, of course, is that Marx's capacious mind was nourished by French and English as well as by German ideas. And the secret of Marx's power is the unique way in which he combines sociological science with a metaphysic of the universe, and both of these with a practical technique for producing the most violent form of historical change—social revolution.

The combination of sociological science, of the metaphysics of history, and of revolutionary politics—the many-sidedness of Marx's appeal—is also the reason why Marx had to wait for his impassioned disciple, Lenin, before Marxism could become the world-shaking ideology which it is to-day. For during the years 1848-1851, when the President of the Second Republic, Louis Bonaparte, was conspiring to become the Emperor Napoleon III, France was suffering from a gross surfeit of revolution. And in England, the one branch of sociological science which had borne fruit was economics, or, as it was then called, "political economy." Adam Smith, Ricardo, John Stuart Mill had laid down its principles. These principles analysed, rationalised, justified and advanced the extraordinarily successful practice of the new British capitalism. The classical economic theory was believed to be validated by the successful economic practice. Just as Newton's theory of universal gravitation was accepted as scientifically established when Halley's comet, the return of which the theory prophesied, duly appeared, so Adam Smith's theory of the Wealth of Nations was regarded as

demonstrated when Britain became the wealthiest nation of the world. Just as Halley's comet, once its orbit had been calculated by Newtonian theory, could be reckoned on to reappear at definite intervals during the next million years or so—or as long as the solar system lasted—why should it be different with capitalist prosperity once the laws of economic change had been discovered by the classical economists?

In prosperous Britain, therefore, an economic heretic such as Marx, with his pronounced anti-capitalist bias, would be bound to be dismissed as a crank. Besides, Marx challenged the basic assumptions of the British classical economics in more places than one. Economics, Marx said, was an historical science. Economic theory was no more timeless than was moral theory. A natural science, such as astronomy or physics, was of a different type from an historical or sociological science such as economics. Were the British economists quite sure that they were objectively scientific? Perhaps there was as much defensive "ideology," as much protective colouring, in their economics as there was a show of objective science. Perhaps the privileged high-priests of capitalism had an unconscious interest in demonstrating to its proletarian victims that their sufferings were prescribed by the irrefutable laws of science which were the iron laws of the universe. Accordingly, Britain had no use for Marx's economics; nor had France for Marx's revolutionary politics. What of Germany?

Germany pullulated in metaphysical systems. Germany might be expected to appreciate the new metaphysical system of dialectical materialism, which was seeking to reconcile the new historical science of economics with the older natural sciences of the type of physics. But Marx and Engels were amateurs in metaphysics. In Germany, the day had not yet dawned when amateurs of genius, such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, could capture the attention of the educated but non-academic public. Even if Marx and Engels had succeeded in finding a publisher for their youthful essay in original metaphysics, "*The German Ideology*," the professional philosophers would have dismissed it as another legacy from the "putrescence of the absolute spirit." The Hegelian system, according to the authors of "*The German Ideology*," was a putrefying corpse. Among the despoilers of the corpse were Stirner, Bauer, and Feuerbach, who ranked as "young Hegelian" philosophers. Marx and Engels attacked the Young Hegelians with enormous gusto. This war of words was of enormous value to Marx and Engels because it helped to clarify their ideas. But why should professional German philosophers be specially interested?

We can see, then, that for good historical reasons neither

Germany, nor France, nor Britain, the three spiritual homes of Marxism, would be likely to pay much attention to its gospel. No man is a prophet in his own country—nor in his three countries. Russia offered the most favourable soil for the seeds of Marxism to germinate in. But no one prior to Lenin could have foreseen this—Marx and Engels least of all. Historians and sociologists are usually wise after the event.

It was not until the nineteenth century, and for the first time in her history, that Russia made a contribution to world literature and world music. Her novelists and composers are among the first rank. But Russia had never produced a philosopher of European distinction. Russian civilization is too young, too immature, too preoccupied with growing pains, for the philosopher, the self-appointed critic of civilization, to take stock of its achievements and deficiencies. In natural science, in history, and in classical learning, though there are one or two distinguished Russian names, there is as yet nothing comparable with the extensive cultural work of the West. In these conditions of cultural poverty, how intoxicating for the young Russian intelligentsia, thirsting for the wine of culture, was the strong draught of Marxian science, history, and metaphysics! Heresies, neglected or persecuted in their countries of origin, have often been welcomed by the unsophisticated peoples in the hinterlands of culture. Christianity and Buddhism are famous examples.

To Lenin, the practical revolutionary, the Marxist contribution to culture was the least of its attractions. Lenin never doubted that Marxism was a science and a world outlook; but what interested him most was its promise and technique of revolution. England, America, and France had all of them experienced successful revolutions, transforming the social structure, and giving a new direction and vitality to the national life. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 under Alexander II was the first step in the Russian social revolution. But it was revolution managed from above. The real revolution had yet to come. The rise in Russia, at the end of the nineteenth century, of a small but highly concentrated industrial proletariat was the first Marxist prerequisite for a successful proletarian revolution; the catastrophic breakdown of the Tsardom in the First World War was the second; and the third and indispensable condition was the presence of a Marxist interpreter of the historic forces in conflict, who was prepared not only to understand the situation but to exploit it. In Lenin, Marxist science, metaphysics, and strategy came into play simultaneously. And so it was in Russia, and not England or France or Germany, that Marxism reaped its first harvest.

The Stone Which the Builders Rejected

The late fruition of Marxism in what was in 1917 the most backward of the great European States created an unprecedented situation for the peoples of the West. And in the thirty years separating us from 1917—thirty years brings a new generation to the front—the Marxist revolution has been followed by the counter-Marxist revolution of the Nazis and their European collaborators. Today, after the liquidation of the Nazis, Russia emerges as potentially the greatest power in the world. She is an Asiatic as well as a European power. And now that Asia is throwing off the yoke of Western capitalism, the fact that the continuous land mass of the Soviet Union has common frontiers with India, China, Persia, and Turkey, will become increasingly important. Ideologies in the shape of the high missionary religions have always travelled rapidly over continents and diffused readily over frontiers. Communism is the great missionary religion of our time—the only world religion which is making converts *en masse*. If Marxism were nothing more than a political doctrine of the same order as democratic liberalism, or nothing more than an economic doctrine such as the doctrine of private enterprise, then its importance, though considerable, would not be overwhelming. But Marxism is also a metaphysical doctrine, and a metaphysical doctrine is a theory of the universe, and therefore a theory of man and of history and of civilization. And this Marxist theory of the universe is more than a mere speculation, a mere intellectual construction. It makes its appeal to the imagination and the emotions, and therefore to the will. Marxism is also a religion.

We are not imputing to the Russians any intellectual inferiority when we remark that in 1917 there existed neither a native Russian philosophy, nor an accredited body of Russian thinkers. The Tsardom and independent thought and thinkers were incompatible. In advance of the Russian revolution it was impossible for the highly contentious doctrines of Marxism to be subjected to critical examination. Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, and other exiled social revolutionaries, in their unhappy and often precarious asylum in some city of the West, might wrangle over the finer points of Marxist tactics or strategy, but criticism of first principles could hardly be expected of them.

Perhaps the Russians are to be congratulated on having escaped the impact on the West of the Classical Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth, and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. If the receptive minds of the Russians had been thrown into such a maelstrom of contentious ideas, they would have had to have been very strong swimmers for their faith in life and action not to have been drowned. Perhaps

in the long run it will prove to have been a happy chance that Marxism, between 1848 and 1917, was not considered important enough by the thinkers of the West to deserve a thoroughgoing and objective analysis. Marxism was neglected in the seventy years between 1848 and 1917 because the West still continued to believe in technical progress, private enterprise, and the pursuit of happiness. There are still some naïve Americans who believe that all these things were guaranteed to them by the Declaration of Independence. And there are to-day millions of naïve Russians who make Dialectical Materialism into their god and Marx into the prophet of god. Blessed are they who believe, for they have a chance of getting the world they desire. The lot of these naïve believers is a happier one than that of the educated classes of the West, so corrupted by scepticism that they believe in nothing.

The uncritical faith of the Russians has saved them from the nihilism, amoralism, and escapism of the period that followed the First World War. But we in the West are not Russians. We cannot believe in Marxism if our only reason for believing is that we must believe in something to escape demoralization. Some of us believe, or would like to believe, in a classless society and in a world union of classless societies. But we cannot disavow our tradition of free thought. If we do so, then we are lost indeed.

We must know which parts of the Marxist creed claim to be economic, historical, and sociological science. Whether the science is sound or unsound is a further question. Whether, and in what sense, history can be a science, and whether sociology is as yet a science at all, are further questions still. Secondly, we must know which parts of the Marxist creed are speculatively metaphysical. And thirdly, we must know which parts are an invitation to us to declare our preference for a particular kind of society, and then, with open eyes for the risk involved, take our chance of getting what we want.

We might satisfy our craving for authoritative guidance through the jungle of our world by accepting Marxism in the same uncritical spirit in which some of our contemporaries have become converts to Catholicism. But when a doctrine becomes an authoritative dogma, it ceases to grow. It can no longer adapt itself to the changing world. And the world has changed so much and so unexpectedly since 1848 that even Marx, with his prophetic genius, could not foresee all the portentous consequences of capitalism for our civilization.

History as Sociology and as Metaphysics

What are we to understand by Marxism? With that question our critical enquiry must begin. We are told that Marxism is an

economic interpretation of history in terms of the class struggle; and that as this interpretation applies to all human history—to universal history—Marxism is a philosophy of history. We are also told that Marxism is an interpretation of the universe—of the large general features of the universe. By definition, such interpretations are metaphysical. Marxism is therefore a metaphysic. And as the universe includes man and his history, but is more extensive than they are, it follows that the Marxist philosophy of history must be a special case or a special department of the Marxist metaphysic. We are also told that Marxism is a contribution to economic science in which the basic conception is that of “surplus value.” The first charge on what the worker produces is the bare minimum necessary to keep him and his children alive. Everything beyond this bare minimum is surplus value; it may be appropriated, and is usually appropriated, by the capitalists.

Is economics a science? Scientific generalizations can be made about the behaviour of the planet Mars or about the gas hydrogen. Can they be made in the same sense about the behaviour of human beings in organized society? If economics is a science, is sociology the more general science. Is economics a branch of sociology? If it is, then politics must also be a branch of sociology. But if economics and politics are branches of sociology, then every generic factor of social life is capable of sociological treatment. Morals, law, language, art, religion—and even metaphysics—can be severally observed and analysed; and can be seen in co-variation with each other as component forces in the force-diagram of a society's life. Or a single component, such as religion, can be momentarily isolated in a number of contemporary or successive societies, and a generalization can even be attempted as to the function of religion in social life.

But if each separate factor of social life is capable of sociological treatment, what of those complexes of social factors which we call civilization? Is a sociology of civilization possible? And as the history of civilized man is the history of his civilizations, are we not in fact asking whether world history, treated scientifically and with due regard to causes and effects, is not equivalent to general sociology?

We know that, traditionally, history has been a branch of literature. The historian told the story of the great men and the great peoples of the world. Like any other literary artist he used his imagination and his powers of sympathetic interpretation to make dead men live again. Whether the events he described really occurred, and in the particular order in which he placed them, was a matter of some concern to him, but not of the highest concern. We have had to wait for Ranke, Mommsen, and the

Higher Critics of the Bible for new standards of truthfulness in such matters.

What did concern the classical historians was the interpretation they were to put upon the lives and acts of men who had lived in the past. However different these lives were from those lived in the present, the historian could interpret them only by analogy with his personal experience of life in the society and civilization of his own times. If, in his view, he and his contemporaries possessed no supernatural powers and enjoyed no supernatural revelations, he had to assume, as a working hypothesis, that the people in the past were similarly unprivileged; and if they claimed that they were privileged, then the historian, in denying that claim, would call upon comparative religion and group-psychology for auxiliary hypotheses to account naturalistically for the way in which these alleged experiences deviated from his own. The historian, being a limited human being and not an all-knowing god, cannot help making his own experience of life the standard by which to measure the experiences of men who are no longer living.

The historian's procedure is not essentially different from that of the dramatist and novelist. The historian is an artist, though his art is highly realistic. His interpretative imagination is controlled by the fact that the persons he describes are people who have really lived, in real cities, upon a real earth. If the historical theme was Roman Britain, then the historian's imagination could not override the fact that Roman roads, baths, villas, coins, and inscriptions, as sheer physical entities, have survived into the present.

The historian was an artist and, potentially at least, he was a sociologist. Was his imaginative interpretation of past persons and peoples to be regarded as a working hypothesis about their motives? Natural science makes use of working hypotheses. Why should not sociological science do the same? Newton and Faraday were imaginative men. The hypotheses they formulated did not jump at them out of the facts. Once imagination had suggested a possible theory, they tested the theory not only by the original facts of which the theory was an induction, but by new ranges of facts released by the theory itself.

Where the historical sciences differ strikingly from the natural sciences is in the fact that imagination can suggest such a large number of alternative hypotheses. The planet Mars and the gas hydrogen are simple creatures: they have no inner life, no motives to original behaviour. The number of plausible theories which can account for their behaviour is in practice limited—though even then, it is false to say that there can ultimately be only one theory, which is *the* truth about them. Is it therefore so surprising that

every historian interprets the past differently? Is it so surprising that there is a Whig and a Tory and a Socialist interpretation of British history? Who can say about Oliver Cromwell that he knows Cromwell's real motives, character, and mind? These things were not clear even to Cromwell himself. If I am a historian writing about the Great Rebellion, I am bound in some degree to construct Cromwell in my own image and Cromwell's times in the image of my own times. I am bound to employ my experience of myself and of the people around me as analogies for the interpretation of other selves and other peoples.

The motives of human beings cannot be excluded from a scientific survey of their acts. And as there can be no infallible method of discovering, measuring, and disentangling these motives—their unconscious motives least of all—it follows that there can be, and must be, a large number of alternative hypotheses about such historical material as is accessible for examination. Each of these alternatives, provided it is genuinely based upon the evidence—and whether it is, or is not, so based, must be left to the historical expert as judged by his professional brethren—each of these alternative hypotheses can throw valuable light upon the past.

Why do we study history? For two reasons. First, because we want to enlarge our views of life's possibilities. We are West Europeans living in an industrial society of twentieth century type, and holding certain beliefs about man, nature, and the universe. Our predecessors lived very different lives, and were sustained or depressed by very different beliefs. We need to inspect their lives in order to become conscious of our own. History, like literature, enables us to live imaginatively, though only for the moment, as different persons in a different civilization. Second, because we want to know how we ourselves came to be the persons that we are in the kind of society in which we find ourselves. We want to know how social causes operating in the past—economic, political, and ideological causes—have conditioned the large features, the chief institutions, of the society in which we find ourselves. Our interest in history is therefore both aesthetic and scientific, both imaginative and practical.

The controversy about the nature of history began in Germany before Hegel's death in 1831; and the problem that history presents has preoccupied German thought ever since. Was history art or science or philosophy? Was a science of history possible? Was a philosophy of history possible? What became of morals, religion, and metaphysics—those traditional claimants to the knowledge of absolute Goodness, Beauty and Truth—if it were recognised that all these values were social factors and that all social factors were historically conditioned, changing with every successive society and

civilization? Was history "ideographic" because it dealt with unique persons and events—persons and events occurring once and once only; or could history also be "nomothetic," that is lawfinding, and therefore a science of recurrent types and classes of events arranged in sequences of causes and effects? If we glance at such a book as Troeltsch's "*Der Historismus und seine Probleme*," with its 772 quarto pages, in which he classes Marx with Sombart and Max Weber, and Comte with Mill and Spencer, we can see how large the question of *Historismus* has loomed before the German mind. And we who have survived the Second World War can supplement Troeltsch's volume by adding the names of Adolf Hitler, the author of "*Mein Kampf*," and of Alfred Rosenberg, the author of "*Der Mythos des 20 Jahrhunderts*" to the German exponents of *Historismus*.

It was in *Historismus* that the German passion for metaphysical thinking indulged itself despite the pre-eminence of natural science between the death of Hegel in 1831 and the rise of Hitler to power in 1933. To ride imaginatively through the centuries, seeing one's own people as the predestined heirs of time and the necessary lords of the world, was a gorgeous day-dream of the romantic German mind. Day-dreams are a compensation of the frustrated. Ever since the modern era began with the Discovery of America in 1492, no great European people has ever felt itself so frustrated as the Germans felt after the catastrophe of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). At a time when centralized monarchies in Spain, France, England, and Russia were founding colonial empires and acquiring wealth by world trade, Germany found herself divided into 234 territorial units, each with its absolutist prince, its separate army, its separate civil service, its separate system of customs, tariffs, and taxation. Germany had to wait for Bismarck and his three successful wars against Denmark, Austria, and France (1864-1871), before Germany could function as an economic and political unity. It is not difficult, therefore, to account sociologically for the romantic metaphysics of the Germans.

If the political unity of Germany had been achieved as early as that of the Netherlands—"Dutch" is a form of "Deutsch," the Dutch being the Low Germans of the Lower Rhine—it is very doubtful whether there would have been any German metaphysics; and even if there were, the type would have been very different from the romantic metaphysics of Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. With natural science applied to her industry, and sociological science applied to the practical problems of her economics and politics, the intellectual climate of Germany would have been as empirical, as imbued with the activist spirit, as that of England. Germany, as a modern industrial power, would

have produced her equivalents to Hobbes and Locke and Hume and Mill. The whole temper of her mind would have been as anti-metaphysical as that of Sir Isaac Newton himself.

The Birth of Marxist Metaphysics

No German thinker of the first rank—not even Marx—has succeeded in withstanding the atmospheric pressure of German metaphysics. When young Marx, then in the twenties, was writing his Theses on Feuerbach, and was trying to systematize his philosophical ideas in a book, "*The German Ideology*," he was in the full tide of rebellion against all metaphysics, not only against Hegel's. It was not then a question of replacing Hegel's "Dialectical Idealism" by Marx's own special brand of Dialectical Materialism. There is no metaphysics in the Communist Manifesto; but there is a great deal of sociology. There is a sociological analysis of the capitalist system so brilliant, so forceful, so devastating, that even the most rabid of anti-communists would have to applaud its intellectual virility. We must remember that the Communist Manifesto was sent to the printer in London on the very eve of the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848. The revolution failed, much to the disappointment of Marx and Engels.

In those pre-1848 years of his young manhood, Marx's thinking was not only anti-metaphysical and empirical, but was an activism of the most pronounced type. The young Marx speaks like an American instrumentalist. He is a John Dewey before instrumentalism was known. Marx is as convinced as is any American "practicalist" that we think in order to act upon our environment and adjust it to our needs. To get a living in an ambiguous world, not too obviously arranged for man's convenience, is man's inescapable problem. Thinking is, primarily, the process of problem solving. When we have solved the most pressing of our problems and have secured a safe and comfortable income, we can divert our concepts, which are the tools of our traffic with the world, to the pleasurable occupation of contemplating it. From activists who change the world we become intellectual aesthetes who enjoy the world diagrammatically. We become engineers in retirement, spending our leisure—and preparing for death—in imaginative metaphysics.

With the exception of Marx no thinker before John Dewey ever thought of saying: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice we must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness of our thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from

practice is a purely scholastic question. Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." (Theses on Feuerbach).

But Marx's activist temper weakened when the revolution of 1848 failed. Marx, who, like Lenin, might have presided over a revolutionary Soviet, reverts to the German scholar of tradition—*der Gelehrte*. Marx sat for nearly twenty years in the British Museum, a poverty-stricken scholar of no academic standing, accumulating the material for the first volume "*Das Kapital*" (published 1867). In these changed circumstances, it is not surprising that the ghost of German metaphysics began to walk again in the many-roomed mansion of Marx's mind.

Engels, who was not as original or as radical in his thinking as was Marx, never broke away from Hegel, not even for a brief activist spell. He writes to Marx (4th July, 1858), "Do send me Hegel's '*Philosophy of Nature*' as you promised. I am now doing some physiology, and shall combine it with comparative anatomy. There are some highly speculative things here, all of which have only recently been discovered; I am very eager to see if the old fellow did not sense something of them. This much is certain; if he had a philosophy of nature to write to-day, the facts would fly into his hands from every side." Among the new discoveries which, in Engel's view, exemplified Hegel's principles were the cell in biology, and the principle of the conservation of energy—two of the outstanding scientific achievements of the nineteenth century. Engels goes on to say, "The cell is Hegel's 'Being in itself,' and its development follows exactly the Hegelian process resulting finally in the 'idea,' that is, each completed organism." It would be interesting to know what a modern biologist who accepts Dialectical Materialism can make of this piece of metaphysical thinking.

Engels, but not Marx, has elaborated the metaphysical aspect of Marxism. It is more than doubtful whether Marx ever saw himself in the rôle of a German metaphysician, in opposition, and yet in the apostolic succession, to Hegel. We can see from Engels' correspondence with Marx that it is Hegel's philosophy of nature—Hegel's philosophy of science, in other words—which Engels finds so attractive. And yet all competent critics of Hegel both in Germany and in England regard the "*Naturphilosophie*" as much the weakest and least defensible part of Hegel's system. Hegel had no knowledge of scientific method. He could not appreciate the part that experiment plays in the work of such great scientists as Newton

and Faraday. Hegel, like his great contemporary Goethe, and like his bastard offspring Hitler, depended, in such matters, upon his unchecked intuitions. But Engels was the most brilliant amateur of his time—perhaps of all time. He could write with just as much distinction and acumen about the strategy of the Franco-Prussian War as he could about “The Origin of the Family” and “The Housing Question.” It is not surprising that the most redoubtable polymath of the nineteenth century should have been fascinated by Hegel’s sweeping generalizations about the cosmic process. How delightful to such a mind as Engels’—how delightful to all our minds, ever ready to enjoy the aesthetic pleasure of economy of statement—was Hegel’s claim to have discovered a law of cosmic development, so general and comprehensive that it held alike for nature, history, and thought. This law was the dialectical principle of the negation of the negation. Engels tells us in the first part of his book “*Anti-Duhring*” that the negation of the negation is a law “which holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and philosophy . . .” “Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”

When we have listed “nature, human society, and thought,” we have made a fairly complete inventory of the universe. So dialectics is a science of the universe, a science of everything in its totality. It is therefore metaphysics. Whether the primal stuff of which the universe consists is “mind” as Hegel believed, or is “matter,” as Engels believed, so that Hegel’s system is Dialectical Idealism and Engels’ is Dialectical Materialism, is of relatively small importance. Engels’ system is more up-to-date, because it squares better with Darwinism and the doctrine of the emergence of creatures having minds out of an originally mindless matter. Hegel’s system, in which mind comes first, squares better with traditional religion, with the Book of Genesis, and the theology of Plato and Aristotle. But though in the one system, “mind,” and in the other, “matter,” is awarded the palm of reality, both systems are dialectical, and in essence they agree.

The Marxism which Socialists Accept

If we in the West who, unhappily, are no longer naïve like the Russians, feel doubtful about Engels’ metaphysics—about all metaphysics, having lived through so many systems in the past—what is the objection to our discarding the metaphysical aspect of Marxism and making the most of its sociology?

Marx has exposed more convincingly than any other social analyst the causes of the periodic crises of capitalism. Like the

periodic eruptions of a volcano they testify to the fierce tensions in the hidden parts below. Marx, with Darwinist realism but independently of Darwin, has thrown a sombre light upon the blood and sweat of civilization. Because human beings are not angels in exile, but creatures of flesh and blood driven by biological urges—the urges for safety, for food, for sex, and for children—they are thrust into the struggle for existence. And because these creatures of flesh and blood live by imagination and intelligence as well as by instinct, they struggle not only to live, but to live in a way that satisfies their idea of themselves.

As soon as civilization proper begins, the primitive communism of the clan-group comes to an end. Large groups, no longer on a face-to-face basis, are the new order of the day. Centralized governments, the administrative officers of the ruling class, emerge, whose primary purpose is to control production, the division of labour, and the division of the product produced by labour. For human work results from the dictate of intelligence to instinct. Work or starve. To shrink from starving is instinctive; but to work in order to starve is not. Civilization is a partially rationalized system of socialized labour. Without socialized labour, civilization collapses. But the question as to who are to be the labourers and who the directors of their work, the question as to how the fruits of labour are to be divided, the question as to what proportion of the blood and sweat of civilization, of its cost to mind and body in wear and tear, is to be assigned to the several classes of society: none of these questions, Marx insists, has ever been decided in the course of human history either by Divine Justice, or by the co-operative intelligence of human beings within a free, equal, and fraternal society. If we examine these questions with the unsentimental realism of Marx, we shall answer that they are questions of power politics and that hitherto they have been decided by the power of the ruling class.

Marx makes a special point of unmasking the ideologists in the service of the parasitic class, who, in the name of morality and religion, attempt to prove that the blood and sweat of the workers is the proper price to pay for spiritual culture, for the absolute values of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. Marx has anticipated Freud by showing how economic interests deeply rooted in biological urges for life and power camouflage themselves conveniently by talking the language of piety and patriotism. There need be no conscious hypocrisy in this use of camouflage. The language of piety and patriotism can be spoken with conviction when the speakers are unconscious of their economic motives.

Let us agree then that the depth and power of Marx's sociology are undeniable. Let us also recognise that he has a distinct bias in

favour of the underdog—the working classes—and let us applaud him for his bias. We have argued that alternative interpretations of history are both permissible and inevitable; and that any one of these interpretations, provided that it is genuinely based on all the evidence available, can claim that it is treating the events of human history in a scientific manner. If then, we define sociology as the scientific analysis of the events of human history, we must recognize that sociology, though a science, admits of alternative interpretations. Let us apply this argument to the Marxist sociology.

Marx's sociology, though it looks at world history from the standpoint of the unprivileged class—the proletariat—sacrificed through the last six thousand years on the altar of human progress—is nevertheless a scientific sociology. No science can guarantee that the future will be exactly what its abstractive laws lead it to predict—least of all an historical science. The future of civilization will be decided, partly by the past as conditioning the present, and partly by our decision to work for the world we want. It has been suggested that Marx wants a classless world society, because in the hinterland of his consciousness, there is the messianic fantasy of the Jew. Suppose it is so. What then? Why should not those of us who have discovered that we want what Marx wants, and who are prepared to learn from Marx's sociology, join ourselves together? Why should we not make propaganda for the Universal Commonwealth, the one world union of classless societies?

What prevents us from being West European socialists who are not committed to the doctrine of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, or the doctrine of the annihilating war between capitalism and communism in which capitalism is the predestined victim, or the doctrine that *all* bourgeois morality and religion is nothing but a camouflage for capitalist interests? Why should it be foolish for West European socialists to believe that *some* part at least of our bourgeois morality and religion has come down to us from the Dark Ages when men despaired of all civilization and despaired more especially of the broken-down agrarian capitalism of Rome? Is our fear unreasonable that a classless world society, which has been preceded by an annihilating civil war between bourgeois and proletarian, may be one in which all the belligerents have lost the desire for civilization?

What assurance can the East European communists give us that despite the wholesale destruction of life and wealth in a global class war, mankind's will to civilization will not be broken? Is it not a fact that the only assurance the communists can give us is based upon Engels' metaphysics? The Russian communists tell us that the communist future of mankind is guaranteed by the laws of history which are the metaphysical laws of the universe. Just as

capitalism is the negation of feudalism, so is communism the negation of capitalism, and, therefore, the negation of the negation of feudalism. The war against capitalist society and the downfall of capitalist society are predestinated by the law of the universe. The communists cannot fail because the universe cannot fail.

The Marxism Which Socialists Reject

We come back, then, to the question of the validity of metaphysics in general and of Engels' metaphysics in particular. Germans and Catholics are the only prominent West Europeans who in the nineteenth century still professed a faith in metaphysics. The Catholics, under Papal patronage, had revived the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Germans had clung to the idealist metaphysics of the Romantic Movement. The Bolsheviks, having no native Russian philosophy, adopted Engels' materialistic version of Hegel's dialectical idealism. In England, in France, in America, metaphysics had either been ignored or discounted. Oxford, the home of lost causes, indulged itself for a decade or two at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth with a highly bowdlerized version of Hegelianism. But a reaction in favour of traditional English empiricism quickly set in . . .

William James has said of Hegel's metaphysics that it was an "impressionistic" glimpsing of the universe. Engels' metaphysics, with which James was not acquainted, comes under the same criticism. We have already quoted the passage from the "*Anti-Duhring*" where Engels says that the negation of the negation holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history, and in philosophy. Certainly, if we look at what Engels has to say about the dialectics of the calculus, we cannot fail to notice his romantic impressionism. If Engels had been less versatile in his role of brilliant amateur, he would have felt a twinge of diffidence, perhaps of intellectual discomfort, when expressing confident opinions on the technique of subjects as different as are biology, geology, mathematics, history, and philosophy. To those who have a competent knowledge of mathematics, Engels' incursions into the subject in the name of the negation of the negation must be regretted as a sample of uncritical amateurism.

Socialists have only sociology; Marxists have metaphysics besides. Marxists are not without sociology—since for grip, penetration, and breadth, Marxist sociology is the best of our times. But socialists, while learning all they can from the Marxist sociology, are without metaphysics. Sociology, to them, is a science. And in common with all sciences, its temper is empirical and experimental. Science does not give certainty, social and historical science least of all. In social and historical science, the margin of possible error is very

large indeed. Sociology can give statesmanlike counsel. But counsel is not dogma. For dogma, we must go to metaphysics, which, in common with theology, promises certainty in an uncertain world. The socialist, being without metaphysics, must be braced for adventure. In common with the Marxist, he wants a world union of classless societies. Marxist sociology enlightens the socialist about the intricate complexity of Western civilization. It teaches him that for the last six thousand years and in every successive civilization, the masses have been subjected to a regime of legalised exploitation.

The ideal that the masses have formed of what success in life means has been patterned, and is still being patterned, on the ideology of their masters. As an ideal, is by no means free, nor can it be expected to be free, from highly egocentric impulses. Societies perish. Their economic and political framework collapses, but their ideology often survives. Those who have once been masters and have been degraded to the level of slaves dream of being masters again. A global society of a sort is perhaps inevitable to-day, now that the fences are down between the congested tenement areas of the world. But we have no metaphysical guarantee that the global society, the Great Society—the greatest possible society as to its geographical dimensions—will not be a servile society with Nazi-like masters and untouchables as slaves. Socialists, since they are empiricists, are prepared, or should be prepared, for all eventualities. They can, and must, battle for the world they want, using all the means—ideological, educational, economic, and political—which the progressive science of sociology suggests to them.

Dogma paralyses the will to adventure. Metaphysics is intellectualist dogma about the universe. It is the empiricist who is the man of faith—not of faith in the ultimate nature of the universe, but of faith in man. The empiricist, as a practitioner of sociological science, has the faith that it is not impossible for men to rise above the blind animal struggle for existence; and even to rise above the conscious human struggle—the struggle of competitive egoisms to appropriate at the expense of rivals a privileged portion of goods and values. The empiricist, being self-consciously human, with no pretensions to superhuman wisdom and authority, can make allowances for the frailty and ignorance of his fellow men, and can hope that his fellow men, in dealing with him, will reciprocate. Metaphysics, if sincerely held as a true believer's theology is held and not profaned into an occasion for intellectualistic sport, is incompatible with toleration. Those who consort with absolutes imperil their humanity.

Marxism is the grand hammerer of ideologies. Yet Marxism,

when it claims to be something more than an empirical sociology, becomes an ideology itself. Marxism asserts that the law, the morals, the religion, the literature, and the world outlook or popular philosophy—the *Weltanschauung*—of a social system is a function of its economic life.

It will be noted that with all the cultural factors just enumerated, there go evaluations. Certain ways of living are valued or preferred by the ruling class of a society. Accordingly, the ruling class invites the moralist, the priest, the poet, and the sage to engage their several powers of constructive imagination in its special service. The priest is an artist just as much as the poet. But the priest's imagination is preoccupied with the universe. And the moralist and sage are also artists. The moralist makes a pattern out of behaviour within society; the sage makes a pattern out of our reactions to life and the world. All these artists are of service to the ruling class. The ruling class invites the artist to discover in the world of imagination sanctions for its rule. The rulers need these sanctions, first, to give them self-assurance, and second, to intimidate the ruled. And as the life of constructive imagination is more attractive than the life of manual work, the ruling class, holding the purse-strings of patronage, subsidises and so controls the "spiritual" persons in its service.

Marxism goes on to notice that the ruling class, by regulating economic life in its own interests, is the prime wielder of political power. The State, as Max Weber said—Max Weber was a German liberal, not a socialist—is the legalised monopolist of the use of coercion. The State—all the states of history from the Ancient Egyptian to the Western capitalist states of to-day—has been the executive committee of the ruling class.

The power, and equally the justice, of this hammering of ideologies is undeniable. What is open to criticism is the assertion that in every society and in every epoch the economic factor is the independent variable and the ideological or cultural factor the dependent one. As a working hypothesis, we might be persuaded to accept this assertion on the grounds that in every society, man, in order to live at all, must be some kind of economic animal; and that until man is established as an economic animal, he cannot be a spiritual one. But in the Marxist propaganda the suggestion is always made that what is economic is "real," what is ideological is no more than "appearance." "Reality" and "Appearance" are terms peculiar to the vocabulary of metaphysics. The metaphysician is presumed to know what is real, what truly and factually exists. But the empirical scientist makes no such claim to a knowledge of the real. All that the sociologist, as an empirical scientist, can set out

to study are the interrelations, the co-variations of economy and ideology.

There are obvious differences between the social status of an Egyptian priest, a Roman augur, and a Medieval pope. The sociologist, with all the social psychology he can command, has the task of accounting for the differences. The sociologist observes that the Egyptian priest and the Roman augur were state-servants. To encourage belief in the permanence of the State was their peculiar office. And the sociologist cannot help contrasting these servants of the State with the Popes, Brahmins, Lamas, of Christendom, Hinduism, and Buddhism, who are the officers of supernational and universal churches. Such churches do not make their entry into history until the political and economic framework of the empire-state has irretrievably collapsed.

Christendom, Hinduism, Buddhism are three civilisations of the Third Order. The sociologist might argue that where Third Order civilisations are concerned, the ideological factor should count as the independent variable and the economic factor as the dependent one. But the Marxist, in turning the economic factor into a metaphysical absolute, is just as much an extremist as is the platonising religionist with his trinity of absolutes—the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. To the platonist the moral law is made in heaven before ever human society begins; and religion is a revelation from above which is independent of the search for assurance to which imaginative men are impelled, when they realise that they live in a world where nature and their fellow men may combine to destroy them. The sociologist is an empiricist. He believes that it is just as unwarrantable to assert that the economic or the material factor is the reality, and the spiritual or ideological factor is the shadow, as to assert the contrary, making what is spiritual or ideological the reality, and what is economic and political the shadow.

It must be noted that metaphysics is not included in the Marxist list of the ideological by-products of economic reality. For, on the Marxist view, metaphysics is science—the science of reality. Metaphysical systems prior to that of Dialectical Materialism may be bad science or effete science or preparatory science which, according to the universal law of dialectics, is superseded or negated in order to enrich, and indeed, to reveal, the richest system of all, which is the reality of realities—Dialectical Materialism.

But if Marx—or rather, Engels as the interpreter of Marx—had been free of the German passion for metaphysics, he would have assigned to metaphysics a notable place amongst the idols of ideology. No department of human culture has a higher title than has metaphysics to ideological status amongst the products of

imagination and desire. Because the metaphysician uses concepts logically arrayed in building his picture of the universe, and because concepts in logical array are also used by the scientist when experimenting on some partially isolated sector of the external world, the metaphysician passes for a super-scientist. The scientist is required to test his assertions by applying them practically in a crucial experiment. But the metaphysician is exempted from this requirement, because his assertions are about the nature of Totality. And there is no way in which the metaphysician can disengage himself from Totality in order to operate upon it. Moreover, there is no branch of ideology which illustrates more neatly the Marxist sociologist theory that ideological products are conditioned by the class structure. And yet Marx never applied his theory to a sociological examination of metaphysics. Was there no relation between the metaphysical idealism of Plato and Aristotle and the sharp separation in the Greek community of servile workers and free men of leisure? It has been left to an American philosopher, Professor John Dewey, the philosopher of instrumentalism—who is not a Marxist—to demonstrate the relation.

In Dewey's magnum opus "*Experience and Nature*," he says: "The Aristotelian conception of four-fold causation is openly borrowed from the arts, which for the artisan are utilitarian and menial, and are 'fine' or liberal only for the cultivated spectator who is possessed of leisure, that is, is relieved of the necessity of partaking laboriously in change and matter." (op. cit. p. 92). "... it was concluded that some men are servile by nature, having as sole function to supply the materials which made it possible for other men to indulge in pure theoretical activity, without distraction by the need of making a living. Thus the conception that thought is the final and complete end of nature becomes a rationalization of an existing division of classes in society" (op. cit. p. 119).

We have already suggested that the romantic character of German metaphysics can be explained in terms of the economic and political backwardness of Germany. But if Engels had employed the Marxist sociology to account in this way for Hegel's romantic metaphysics, he would have been compelled to remove the Negation of the Negation from the realm of tested science to the realm of untested ideology. But the Negation of the Negation is the backbone both of Engels' Dialectical Materialism and of Hegel's Dialectical Idealism. Engels was not prepared to take this step which would have cracked his own backbone as well as Hegel's.

If we look at the historical facts objectively, we are forced to the conclusion that Marxism has failed to distinguish between science and metaphysics, and between metaphysics and philosophy; and

that Marxism has also failed to distinguish between a natural science such as physics and an historical and sociological science such as economics.

The Role of the Philosopher in History

What in human history has been the social function of the philosopher? Is his function necessarily the same as that of the metaphysician? As twentieth century students of world history we are now in a position to bring Chinese and Indian thought under review. The Greeks, the Medieval Scholastics, and the Moderns since Bacon and Descartes, provide only a fraction of the material which the sociologist can examine.

Philosophy arose in three civilizations of the Second Order—the Greek, Chinese, and Indian—because each of these civilizations was forced by the course of events to become highly conscious of itself. In each of these civilizations the discovery was made that institutions which had developed unobserved through the centuries in the semi-silence of unselfconscious life would need critical revision. They had worked well in the past. They were now working under strain. Such institutions had been accepted with natural piety as the work of the founding fathers of the community—the divine gods and heroes. It now began to be suspected that in such institutions as those of law, morals, and religion, ordinary human agents had been at work as well as divine.

Philosophy begins therefore with an enquiry into human nature as revealed in social relations. The technique of social living, as they are seen at work in the family and the State, are the first to be examined. A theory as to how the techniques work and why they have come to fail is subsequently attempted. We can advance, then, this sociological generalization about Confucius, the Buddha, and Socrates: they start in their careers as inspectors and critics of customary behaviour. Primarily they are moralists. A moralist is a philosopher, and a philosopher is a practical sociologist. The practical sociologist wants to understand society in order to change it. We can say, then, that the first philosophers of importance were social reformers. In China, and at first in India, the reformers succeeded in giving a new format to traditional society. In Greece and in the post-Buddhist Age in India, the reformers fail. Organised society breaks down. And anxiously thoughtful men look to the world of ideas for an escape from the pains and perils of civilization. The quest for certainty begins. Philosophy abandons its critical inquiry into the working of civilization. It loses interest in practical sociology. It becomes metaphysics. Out of the ideas whose traces reside in the brain, the unhappy consciousness can

build an inner castle whose architecture delights it, and whose secure remoteness from the battleground of the external world provides a place of refuge.

"Metaphysics makes monsters of us all"

There are two major conflicts which are rending our world: one is about ends, the other about means. The conflict about ends is between the Left and the Right. The Left wants a new world in the shape of a union of classless societies. The Right wants the traditional world, in which individuals of the ruling class live what is, in essence, a private life, in privileged separation from the life of the masses, upon whose labour their privileges depend. The conflict about means is between two neighbouring sectors of the Left: it is the conflict between socialists whose techniques for economic and political action are based upon an empirical sociology, and Marxists who combine empirical sociology with a metaphysic of history.

Marx is the first genius that the new nineteenth century science of sociology has to show. He made of sociology a tool for scrapping old and raising new civilizations. His intense imaginative realism has built a bridge of steel uniting the most primitive civilizations of the past with the advanced civilization of to-day. He sees all history as the history of man's struggle, first with nature, and then with his fellow men. He sees that progress in civilization has been bought at the price of the enslavement of the many for the benefit of the few. He tears off the veil of ideology woven by the subsidized apologists for the few, to justify to the many the way of God in history. There can be no question that this man of genius has advanced the great cause of mankind.

But it is, nevertheless, a great misfortune for the world that the first influential interpreter of Marx should have been Engels, a German, under the spell of the romantic metaphysics of his native land; and that the second influential interpreter of Marx should have been Lenin, a Russian, who had grown up in a country with no tradition of philosophical thought, and who was therefore precluded from turning the light of criticism upon Engels' metaphysics.

The conflict between Western socialists and Eastern communists is a conflict of empiricists and metaphysicians, of the empirical and the metaphysical approach to the problem of civilization. The socialist accepts the Marxist sociology—the so-called economic interpretation of history—as a working hypothesis of sociological science. Marx, he hopes, will enlighten him as to the social forces that have shaped our Western civilization—forces which are bound

to condition every possible future for mankind. Among the possible futures, there is one of special interest to him: the organization of mankind into a world union of classless societies. But the socialist is not a metaphysician. He rejects the view that Feudalism, Capitalism, and Communism are world-historical movements whose function it is to be the necessary agents of the economic and material progress of the world. Because Engels has substituted world-historical movements for Hegel's world-historical persons, and a world economic and material process for Hegel's World-Spirit, he does not succeed in making the metaphysic of Dialectical Materialism any more acceptable than Hegel's metaphysic of Dialectical Idealism. For all metaphysical views of universal history become apologies for the crimes and follies of mankind. The Absolute can do no wrong. The Absolute is unmoved by the passions, ambitions, the Machiavellism, the ruthlessness, the blind inhumanity of its appointed agents. And yet the Absolute is prepared to profit by all that its agents do in its name.

In the Introduction to his *"Philosophy of History,"* Hegel instances Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon as "World-historical men, the heroes of their epoch, the truth speakers for their age, the soul-leaders who take the necessary sequent steps in progress, the agents of the World-Spirit whose end in view was their master-passion, and who, when that end was attained, fall off like empty hulls from the kernel." If Hegel had lived a generation or two later, he would undoubtedly have acclaimed Bismarck and Hitler as World-historical men of the new series, in the apostolic succession to Frederick the Great. And if confronted with the death-chambers of Belsen and the murder of six million Jews—naked women and children stripped even of their artificial teeth for the sake of the pennyworth of gold that might be extracted from them—Hegel would have replied "that the particular is for the most part of too trifling value, as compared with the general, not to be sacrificed and abandoned; that it is from the particular and its negation that the universal results." Hegel would have told us that Hitler was a World-historical agent of the World-Spirit, and that "such individuals are devoted to the end they have in view regardless of all else; that quite possibly such men will treat great and even sacred interests inconsiderately . . . but that such mighty figures are bound to trample down many an innocent flower and crush to pieces many an object in their path."

Hegel would have invited us to refrain from a "Litany of Lamentations" about the fate of these Jews, Poles, and Russians. He would have told us that philosophy—and by philosophy, he means metaphysics—"leads us to the insight that the real world is

as it ought to be; that the truly good—the universal Divine Reason—is not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realising itself; that this Good, this Reason, in its most concrete form, is God; that God governs the world; that the actual working of his government—the carrying out of his plan—is the history of the world; that this plan, philosophy strives to comprehend; that only what has developed as a result of the plan possesses genuine reality; and that what does not accord with the plan is negative and worthless existence.” Hegel in justifying Hitler would have told us that “Philosophy wishes to discover the substantial import of the divine idea in order to justify the so much despised reality of things.” And Hegel would have concluded his apology for the Nazis with this grandiose metaphysical finale: “Reason is the completion of the Divine Work. The claim of the World-Spirit rises above all special claims.”

Metaphysics, if mistaken for science, makes monsters of us all. That human beings should be so entangled in their biological necessities, and so driven by their biological appetites, as to behave with insensate cruelty to their fellows, is intelligible. But that human beings—finite, limited human beings conditioned by nature and by history—should presume they know the innermost laws of the universe, the laws of universal history and therefore of human history, and that on the strength of this pretended knowledge should condone, after the event, everything that man has done to his fellow man, on the plea that everything is included in Totality, and that what Totality has prescribed cannot be gainsaid: that human beings should swagger their delusively absolute knowledge, their vain metaphysical knowledge of the universe, is indeed the sin against the human spirit. Dewey rightly says that to believe that what eventually happened must have been preceded by an idea or intention or schema before it actually happened is the prime fallacy of metaphysical thinking. Because some of our acts are preceded by ideas or plans or schemes, we imagine that the universe behaves as we behave. It is easy to dope one's conscience, to immunize one's heart against pity, once we let ourselves be persuaded that we are doing the will of the God of Theism, or of the Krishna of Hinduism, or of the World-Spirit of Hegel, or the Dialectical Economico-Materialist Principle of Engels.

True Humanism

The Soviet Union is at present taking little or no part in the work of Unesco. The difference between the empirical and the metaphysical approach to the problem of creating One World for the Common Man shows itself significantly in the Soviet refusal to

co-operate. The socialist, being an empiricist, and working with an empirical sociology, is convinced that it is very necessary to capture the emotions and the imagination of the masses on behalf of a new type of associated living—of living in world community. But the Marxist, being a metaphysician, does not believe that propaganda conducted by Unesco will hasten the coming of the classless world society. What the Marxist wants the masses to believe is what he himself believes. The Marxist believes that the proletarians are the predestinated victors in the inevitable war between capitalism and communism. For the dialectical process of the universe cannot be gainsaid. Just as capitalism was the negation of feudalism, so communism will be—must be—the negation of capitalism, and therefore the negation of the negation of feudalism. And by 'negation' the Marxists mean destruction, annihilation, liquidation. Just as the feudal lords excluded the burgesses from power, so the proletarians must and will exclude the burgesses. For the Industrial Revolution, itself the work of the capitalist class, has, with divine irony, promoted the proletarians, who are also the work of the capitalist class, to the rank of the new agents of the Absolute. The indignation of the proletarians against the capitalists is not moral indignation—communism dismisses moralistic talk as hypocrisy—it is the wrath of God, the fury of the Absolute, for those of his agents, who dismissed by him from his service, refuse to resign.

And so the Russians are not inclined to be the missionaries of the new religion of socialism. They hold such a commanding position in the world that proselytes, if they chose to make them, would flock to them from every quarter of the globe. Stalin could play the role that the Second Isaiah cast for Cyrus: he could lead the New Israel, The United Nations of the World, into the New Kingdom of Man—the Kingdom of Freedom, where human beings would be free at last from the futile competitiveness of the economic struggle for existence.

But to fulfil this role Stalin would have to ignore the metaphysics of Marxism. He would have to see human beings as they really are, and not as inert chattels locked up in two monstrous metaphysical pantechnicons called capitalism and communism. The capitalist and communist social systems are unquestionable realities, if we mean that human persons live their lives, in part consciously, and for the greater part unconsciously, in an historic network of social relations which the great majority find it difficult to understand and still more difficult to control. But human beings, once they have achieved a minimum standard of relatively secure living, develop interests additional to those which are purely economic. They develop an interest in their personal destiny and in the destiny

of man upon the earth. It is no compliment to the masses to assume that all they want is bread, sex, and circuses.

It will not be possible for very long to hide from the masses the bitter truth that human life is a little oasis of consciousness in the vast deserts of the material universe. And when they learn this truth, will it not be necessary to sustain their will to civilization? Is not the creation of a classless world society the greatest of human enterprises—the greatest adventure of human beings into the unknown? Will not this new experiment in living demand from the adventurers loyalty, self-discipline, self-abnegation? Will it not demand of them devotion, attachment, faith? Must not the masses be made to feel that in the Day of the Universal Commonwealth, a new significance will have come into human life—into the life of everyone? Must they not be made to realise that a new height will have been added to every man's stature, when every man is making, upholding, and enjoying the supreme work of human art—the world-union of the human race?

In a little while we of this generation will be dead, and we cannot hope that in this world or in any other the sun of our individual consciousness will rise again. The world community is our empirical immortality. In the Universal Commonwealth the lonely and despairing individual of our time will satisfy at once his passion for community and for immortality. Within the framework of world institutions, and with the genius of all the peoples of the earth to call upon, new vistas of greatness in associated living open up before the imagination.

If atheistic Darwinism becomes—as it will become—common currency all over the globe, what will there be to encourage man's will to civilization? The building of the Universal Commonwealth is sure to prove the most difficult and exacting of human labours. If we have no larger hope than one based upon Dialectical Materialism, we shall be compelled to see ourselves as lumps of living matter shovelled meaninglessly from the womb to the crematorium by a biological bulldozer which we cannot control. But we are not bound to regard ourselves as solitary specks of consciousness housed in decaying bodies from which we gaze forth upon the stony face of the universe. We are children of the human race. We can, if we choose, be comrades in weal and woe. We can face the world if we are fellows and companions in a genuine community: for we can count on being comforted and sustained by our own kind.

So there is yet time for the presumptuous demon of metaphysics to be exorcised, and for the good news of the coming of the kingdom of man to be published abroad in every quarter of the earth.

JOHN KATZ

[Two of our readers have earlier this year visited the Near and Middle East to study aspects of the conditions there in order to form opinions of the part which can be played by the countries of those parts in progressive movements affecting the peace of the world. The last part of Dr. Hopkins's article is taken from the concluding chapter of a book he is writing, addressed to his fellow citizens in America.]

RECENT IMPRESSIONS OF THE NEAR EAST

IN May of this year, I made a rapid journey by air from California, where my family and I are now living, to Iran. On the outward journey I halted briefly in Turkey and Iraq; and on the return trip, in Greece and Italy. This article is an attempt at a summary of conditions as I found them in those lands.

Iran

In Iran, the most distant of these countries, I was largely the guest of a former college mate, the Khan de Farrokh. He obtained interviews for me with the Shah, his twin sister Princess Ashraf, the Ministers of Health, Labour, and Propaganda, and other political personages, the heads of the two principal banks, the leaders of the dominant religion (Shi'ah Islam), and of the Zoroastrian, Sufi and Bahai cults, and men prominent in education and art.

The Iranian politico-economic situation is dominated by the fear of Russia. In past years Russia and Britain have pushed their rival plans to exploit Persian petroleum, to the accompaniment of intrigues which were not always too savoury. To-day American companies have also come into the field. Russia finds that she has a very useful weapon at hand in the doctrine of Communism. Communist missionaries go into areas like Azerbaijan with the same zeal as Christian missionaries have gone into heathen lands. People who are as desperately poor as they are in Iran feel they have nothing to lose by whatever change and are ripe for conversion. Russia poses as the champion of their new faith just as France or Spain has at times posed as the champion of Christianity, and the converted people are ready to back her political demands.

When I went home at night in Teheran I used to see what I at first took to be sacks of cement left by workmen on the sidewalk, but which I soon found were some of these workmen themselves, who had no home to go to, or sick people for whom no hospitals nor doctors were available. It is among such as these that Communism spreads. The Shah said, in our interview, "Six years ago I pointed out to the Mejlis that Communism can't be checked on the military front alone; it must be checked also on the economic front." This point was also grasped by such business men as the president of the bank Melli, who holds that agriculture must be enabled to

provide more food for the people and an opportunity to earn it through the construction of great irrigation projects, which incidentally will also produce electric power for factories. But Iran cannot find the cash to finance such projects unless America is prepared to make her a loan.

Turkey

In Turkey, the first thing which struck my attention was the number of soldiers carrying on manoeuvres all through the countryside. They are seen everywhere; and one learns that this little nation of 18,000,000 people still keeps up a standing army of 650,000 because of her fear that the large number of troops whom Russia keeps under arms just across the border may any day invade her. So large an army is a terrible financial drain; and I think there can be little doubt but what Russia keeps up this "war of nerves" in order that Turkey shall remain poor and undeveloped. Russia feels that it is unfair that the access of her 200,000,000 people to the Mediterranean could be imperilled because the Dardanelles are held by a little country which might become hostile to her. One can admit that this grievance is not utterly unreasonable, without granting Russia's right to take what she wants from Turkey by military pressure. There is really no solution of this kind of problem except to internationalize all such strategic regions (including Gibraltar and the Suez and Panama Canals) under a United Nations which shall be organized on a federation basis like our own United States. But although Russia would greatly benefit by this development, she is led by her suspiciousness to block it with insistence on national sovereignty and big nations' right to veto majority decisions.

I was shown institutes in Turkey where leaders are trained to help the country villages' progress, and others in which the new generation are being turned into skilful mechanics and competent home-makers. It is foolish to deny that the governments ruling most or all of these countries are pretty fascist; but there are also democratic forces in the field, and these are greatly helped by the friendly admiration now so generally felt towards the United States. The Turks, although by nature perhaps a little lazy compared with, say, the Italians, stand out in the East as people of sterling character. They have shown a commendable energy in their attempt to throw off the dead weight of tradition and become a modern nation. Sturdy fighters, they are prepared to stand as a first line of resistance against possible aggression from the North; but they cannot develop real strength except by building factories and railroads, draining their swamp-lands, conquering malaria, etc.—and for these things, money is needed. To supply this might cost America less than the alternative will cost.

In the two countries just mentioned, party politics as we know it is in the first stages of birth. In Greece, by contrast, there are so many political parties that none has an electoral majority and they have to form coalitions in order to govern. For many people, party affiliation is not so much decided by platforms or principles as by the personalities of leaders. I had interviews with several politically prominent figures, including Pomayotis Canelopoulos, Alexander Svolos, and Constantine Tsatsos.

Beginning with the parties of the political "right," *i.e.*, the conservatives, and working towards the "left," the principal parties are: (1) Royalist Party, led by Tsalidaris, who is now Premier; (2) an offshoot of the Royalists, led by Markezinis, who is grouped together with the Queen as having "the two cleverest brains in Greece"; (3) the Unionists, led by Canelopoulos. The above three parties, at the time of my visit, formed together "the government," although Canelopoulos apologized to me for his group being associated with the other two, saying it was republican, as were at least 60 per cent. of Greeks, but it felt that at this moment everybody ought to strengthen the government's hand against the Communists. (It is a tribute to Greek belief in freedom of the press that they permitted publication at that time of a Communist newspaper although the Communists were fighting as guerillas in the hills and enjoyed foreign support.) There were two parties of the centre, led by (4) Socrates Venizelos, son of a more famous father, and by (5) Papindreu, a man of much cleverness. The parties of the left were (6) the Socialists led by Svolos, who told me they advocated a "middle of the road" policy towards Russia, and (7) the Communists—though personally I am one of those who think the Communists should be considered of the extreme "right" rather than "left," since they have come to stand for the ultimate in authoritarianism and nationalism. The above are only seven of the parties in Greece, but they are the important ones.

Tsatsos is a professor at the University of Athens and gave me a most interesting account of the development of these parties and especially of how the old-time split between the Venizelists and anti-Venizelists was transformed into the present split between "left" and "right." During the German occupation he was a leader of the underground. In the beginning, it was enough that he was a Greek for any Greek home to afford him refuge. But at the end of the war, a man would only receive shelter from those who belonged to his own faction—if he fell in with a partizan of the wrong faction he might even be surrendered to the Germans.

Italy

In Italy, there is a similar multiplicity of parties. Three rightist, two centrist and three leftist parties are important enough to deserve mention.

On the extreme right the Uomo Qualunque, led by Giannini, is a receptacle for malcontents who hardly deny that they would like fascism back again. Next is the Liberal Party, led by the famous philosopher Benedetto Croce. They are "liberal" in the English rather than American use of the term, which means they stand for minimum government interference with industry. Also of the right is the Action Party led by Gianca.

Then come the Centrist parties. Chief among them, and, in fact, largest of all Italian parties, although still very far short of constituting a majority of the whole electorate, are the Christian Democrats, whose leader is de Gasperi. They are generally known as the Catholic party, although the Church does not enter politics officially. Another centrist party is the Republican, led by Pacciardi; and there are several minor ones of little importance.

On the left are, first of all, two Socialist parties which split over the question of friendliness to Russia. The main body of Socialists, led by Nenni, refused to have any dealings whatever with the Communists. Thereupon a section who wished to be "fellow travellers" with Russia seceded under the leadership of Saragat and call themselves the PSLI (Italian Socialist Labour Party). Finally rounding the circle at extreme "left" or extreme "right," as you prefer, are the Communists.

The most interesting interview I had in Rome was with Monsignor Tardini, who is probably next to the Pope in rank in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and is commonly considered the Holy Father's "Minister of Foreign Affairs." He described to me the Vatican's policy as friendly to international co-operation without preference as to whether it took the form of treaties, alliances or a federation; impartial among forms of government except that it was definitely hostile to all dictatorships; but inclined to tolerate the Franco régime in Spain in the hope it would decay of itself rather than inclined to take a chance that when overthrown it might be replaced by Communism.

Summary of Impressions

Let me now summarize my impressions of the trip with respect to certain criteria applied to all the countries visited.

As to health and comfort, the little inconveniences which to-day everywhere exist to irk even the *de luxe* traveller deserve to be forgotten in view of the appalling destitution of the populations of these

regions. Especially are the malaria-ridden areas of Turkey and the doctorless and hospital-less multitudes of Iran and the myriads of half-fed human beings throughout that whole part of the world a rebuke to us back here in America, who spend billions of dollars on tobacco, liquor, gluttony and sheer waste of food.

Politically, while the only hope of the world is to avoid another war through the supersession of sovereign nations and their competitive armaments by a United Nations unhampered by any State having veto power over the actions of the majority, the immediate interest of the eastern nations is centred upon the advance of Communism. Russia, out of anxious mistrust of the western capitalistic powers who once invaded and until very lately snubbed her, declines to help make the United Nations effective. Although not desiring war, she puts her trust instead in strengthening herself militarily and strategically, using the Communist doctrines as an official means to "soften up" the small neighbour States so that she may dominate them. So long as Russia takes an intransigent attitude about the United Nations, so long will it be the part of the English-speaking peoples to assure these small countries of our military support in case of overt aggression; but in doing so we need to press those nations (as we have done to some extent in Greece) to liberalize their policy, admit a wider representation of opinion in their government and respect civil liberties. Unless we do so and give a real lead to democratic influences we play into the hands of our opponents who accuse us of supporting fascism.

Economically, the eastern countries are so inadequately developed that a large part of their population is too desperately poor to have any stake in maintaining the *status quo*. It will therefore pay us to give them as generous amounts as we can scrape together to finance agricultural, irrigation, and electric development among them until they are able to go forward under their own power. We should scrap our illusion that we shall be repaid in cash or even in gratitude in any great degree for these advances, because it is a psychological fact that a sense of indebtedness is painful and generates hostility in the debtor even as it generates smugness in the creditor. What our taxpayers are entitled to insist on is that all tariffs be kept down to the level of revenue needs and that we be privileged to check on whether our advances are being used honestly and efficiently for the purposes for which we intended them. The gifts of money or credit to these countries are not altruism but are a few billions of insurance against the spreading grassfire of Russo-ophile Communism, in the hope of averting or at least postponing World War III, that would cost more than the three hundred billion of the last one. Let us endure higher taxes yet and rationing and live frugally rather than that should happen again.

We should, meanwhile, moderate our propaganda for unhampered "free enterprise," which gives the impression that we as well as the Russians have a doctrinaire "ism" to support, and one which lacks the allure of novelty. We should be contented instead to let other countries make their own decision about adopting co-operative or collective ownership of public enterprises and natural monopolies if they think that this will save them from the dangers of oligarchic control, for that is their own affair. We can also save ourselves much expense in the long run by dropping the nationalistic stipulation that all goods bought with the money we lend shall be purchased from ourselves instead of in the cheapest market. For if our object is to "prime the pump" of Eastern economy in the knowledge that we can only grow more prosperous if the rest of the world gets on its industrial feet, then the more cheaply they can be got on those feet the less "loans" (which will become gifts) need be made by our taxpayers.

Socially, these countries nearly all suffer from an excess of population which can only be met by the encouragement of birth-control. At Ayr on May 16, Winston Churchill warned Britain not to under-rate "the gravity of the economic and financial distresses in which we are moving. They will be of greater intensity and severity than any we have known before." Yet he clamours for more babies than last year's 925,000 (an excess of 368,000 over deaths) to be supported in this distress! None of the Near-East countries is able to feed properly the population it has already. Common-sense dictates they should show their ability to do this before they produce still more mouths. Till then, moreover, it will be hard for even the most perfect United Nations to prevent the denser populations from seeking their "place in the sun" by resort to aggression, and the billions which we are spending upon the rehabilitation of Europe ought to be accompanied by a pressure on the nations to adopt measures for keeping their population at the present level until they are in a position to feed the new mouths. I would even say we should *insist* upon this as a *condition* of our help, except that in the present international situation help *must* be given for a time whether or no.

Intellectually, I had a chance to see how superstitious survivals could retard the growth of world unity, as by arousing fanatical persecution of a minority group in a village in Turkey or by blocking the spread of birth-control information in Italy. The tendency upon the whole is nevertheless everywhere towards more literacy, a greater amount of reading and more sophistication towards propaganda. Renascent countries (e.g., Turkey) may make use of the teaching of history in a way that reminds one too much of Nazi Germany. That both Communism and anti-Communism can also

become ideologies of this type was evident in Greece. In the countries under consideration, political thinking is sometimes clearer than I find it at home. The reactionist elements tend to use the "smear technique" by which all progressive ideas are lumped together and called "Communistic." This is a very dangerous intellectual slovenliness which renders citizens unable to distinguish good from bad proposals and makes them robots voting according to shibboleths. But before we can take a stand against this in the East, we must get rid of the same tendencies at home. Perhaps this slovenly, obscurantist name-calling is a weak attempt to make up for the judgment attributed to John Foster Dulles by the *Science Monthly* (March, 1946) that the democratic nations "have no great faith that moves them. We are in no mood to seize on the United Nations as an agency for accomplishing some great purpose in the world."

Child-care and psychiatry are the aspects of civilization in which all these lands are most backward. Into none of these countries have the ideas of a more individualistic and considerate manner of handling children penetrated very deeply. Yet the primary school system of Turkey has been to some extent remodelled on ideas brought from socialist Austria, and, moreover, Iran, and indeed most of these countries, have teachers trained in the United States who are propagating modern ideas in education and among parents of the professional and well-to-do classes.

In sum, the Near East is far from resembling "the best of all possible worlds." On the other hand the direction of its movement is towards democracy and the politics and culture associated therewith, and this tendency will continue so long at least as its present gratitude, admiration and liking for America. Our assistance should aim, however, at a period longer than that over which gratitude endures, by pressing strongly for increased accommodation to the principles of democracy, efficiency, prudence, truthfulness, etc., without which all the benefits we can bestow will be ephemeral.

PRYNS HOPKINS

WOMEN OF THE MIDDLE EAST

THE International Alliance of Women sent Dr. Hannah Rydh, of Sweden, their president, and myself, their treasurer, on a flying visit to Egypt, Irak, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Ethiopia, calling on the return in Rome, Geneva, and Paris. We made our report to the Board of the Alliance meeting in Stockholm in May last. Why is the Alliance anxious to get into contact with the women of the

Orient? Do they really have problems like ours? Do we interfere with their development? Are our struggles different fundamentally or only in time? Looking back on the old contact between East and West during thousands of years, we recognize that the East long before the West had a developed culture and gave much to the West. We are now giving the East industrial development: looking for raw materials, we offer in exchange modern techniques. There exists an interaction between social development and industrialization, and the lives of the women of the East are necessarily affected. The transition to the new era will cost the women of the East as much as it cost the women of the West. The way to industrialism creates a proletariat of downtrodden women with the gulf of prostitution at the side of the road. The International Alliance of Women believes in democracy, because democracy includes the citizenship of all, women as well as men, and thereby qualifies society for peace and understanding as well as for reform. We have to show the women of the East that their participation, as equal with men, in the new social legislation is necessary to the well-being of their countries and will help the world to find peaceful solutions of conflicts between classes, races, and States.

Egypt

Egypt is becoming a modern State, and the consciously progressive women in many countries of the East admire their Egyptian sisters who have, many of them, emancipated themselves from the veil, and are now studying in all faculties of the University of Cairo.

The girls now want political equality, and bills to enfranchise women have been presented to the legislative assemblies, but not carried. Why is a man without education allowed to exercise civic rights when an educated woman is not? It has to be recognized, however, that educational development is still mostly reserved for a small privileged part of the population. By the side of, and connected with, illiteracy, the problem of poverty among the great body of the people is a heavy burden upon Egypt.

The fate and welfare of the masses of the people are in the hands of the great landowners. Social work is mostly in the stage of charity. There are, of course, great undertakings started by women: day nurseries, centres for child care, housewifery and sewing courses, Red Cross campaigns against malaria and epidemics. But compared with the needs of the people, all this is as a drop of water in a lake. So we said, Educate the women, all the women, as well as the men, and ask them to bring their knowledge, love, and understanding to the solution of social problems in Egypt.

Iraq

In Basra, Mosul, and everywhere else, the women were veiled, with few exceptions. There are women, however, doing great work behind the veil: as that most intelligent, charming, and efficient director of a girls' secondary school in Mosul. She bashfully pulled a black veil in front of the whole face, and wrapped a black aba round her well-shaped and, for the rest, fashionably dressed person before she stepped out into the street. With such handicaps, complete seclusion from men and public life, these women have instituted schools, kindergartens, crèches, hospitals and clinics, work-rooms, etc. It is hard pioneers' work, limited by prejudice and custom. They have to give milk to be allowed to give advice. They are obliged to allow mothers to come and live in the hospital when their children are being treated, sitting all day on the floor by their beds. Nursing is a despised profession; it is thought humiliating to have to be busy with the duties concerned with the cleanliness of the patient.

We spoke to many classes of children in different schools who understood English, telling them of the youth in our countries and of the work that lay before women. The University of Baghdad admits girls, but they have to proceed to universities abroad for post-graduate studies. The intellectual profession to which most women have devoted themselves is teaching, in which they are on an equal footing with men, equal in pay and promotion. There is quite a number of very able modern, unveiled, professional women in Baghdad. This is not so in the rest of the country; and if there is more illiteracy amongst women, that depends on the general view in Iraq, up to now, that the women as a rule should have no profession and consequently need no education.

The Women's Union has affiliated itself to the Alliance, and will be active in our deliberations. But much has to be done, and I repeat that the veil is not merely a fashion, it is a wall which materially and spiritually debars the bearer from the development and opportunity of co-operation which comes from intercourse with men, in a world crying out for co-operation.

Iran

We went flying over the snow-capped mountains to meet a group of able and hard-working women in Teheran, 1,500 metres above sea-level. A woman professor at the university, a woman inspector of schools; wonderful university buildings, full of keen students: this is Iran, where women are not veiled, where life is freer. But also where little girls of six and seven make carpets all day for a few pence! Land ownership keeps the land less productive than it should be, and people are very poor, though tobacco, opium, sugar,

tea, rice, pistachio, textiles, besides oil, bring good revenue to the country. The people need better houses, and house sanitation does not exist even in Teheran. The emancipation of women from the veil, with consequent deliverance from seclusion and ignorance, should produce more equality before the law, especially in regard to marriage and divorce, and enable women to win the franchise and play their part in speeding up social reform.

Turkey: The Land of Rapid Progress

Ankara is the site of an ancient civilization. The old majestic citadel remains and is being restored as a museum; but modern buildings have taken possession of the town, and all is modern in Ankara. Our International Congress of 1935 in Istanbul had given us an idea of the sensational step taken by this Oriental country. To-day the progress of the women of Turkey is an object lesson to other Eastern countries. The example is given in public hygiene, in sick nursing, in medical organization providing midwives and health officers. The battle against malaria and tuberculosis is on a scale unheard of before. The children's and maternity hospitals, the homes for the protection of orphans and abandoned children, are admirable. There are fair labour laws, and there is international co-operation. Surely such reforms are not uncorrelated with the admission of women to Parliament and to the municipalities?

Greece

On the 'plane flight over Greece you gaze on pictures of fine cut coasts carved in a sea of turquoise and emerald. Nearing Athens, the Acropolis comes in sight and towers over all: a unique sight, unique as Greece itself and its women. No one can imagine how much women have suffered, what they have done in the most terrible circumstances, and what efforts they are making now in these troubled times. They show courage, steadfastness, hard work and devotion, and not least good taste and simplicity, as well as a full appreciation of all that relates to culture. There is a flourishing National Council of Women, a group of university women, a well-organized Y.W.C.A., Girl Guides, women's groups in all the political parties, and our own affiliated Society for the Rights of Women, working steadily as ever. The war has been devastating to children, and they are being taken care of by admirable women in fine organizations.

Greek women demand the right to vote and to be elected to municipal councils and to parliament. So far they have been promised everything by all parties, but given only a municipal vote, without eligibility; and, what is worse, there exists no register for women municipal voters, and no register is being prepared. Women are told to apply with a birth certificate and a

proof of literacy. This applies to women only. The men's register is being revised without any effort on their part. The legality of this procedure will probably be tested by a young woman lawyer. Perhaps it is not only procedure that is at fault, but common sense that is lacking. Who better than the Greek women could help their country?

Ethiopia: Modern Women in an Old Country

Dr. Rydh went alone to Ethiopia, and says that among the Christian Ethiopians—and most of the population is Christian since long ago—the woman has always held a good position. She is recognized in law and custom as a free partner of the man. She participates in decisions concerning the family, she is able to possess her own property, and she is often the clever adviser of her husband. In case of divorce, children and property are divided between wife and husband. No universal suffrage exists in Ethiopia, but when the time is ripe for this there is no reason why women should not be enfranchised at the same time with men. There is nothing in the law to forbid women obtaining any kind of official post or carrying on any profession. Certainly there are already many women in Ethiopia capable of playing their rôle in public life. An association called "Ethiopian Women's Work Association" has applied for affiliation to the International Alliance. We shall warmly welcome them. The president is the Emperor's eldest daughter, and she is very active in the country.

Mesopotamia

Ur of the Chaldees, Nineveh, Babylon: through the lands which were the cradle of our civilization, we travelled, and studied not only the women, but also, since Dr. Rydh is a distinguished archaeologist, the traces of civilization sometimes as old as 6,000 years. We found pictures and clay figures representing the Mother-goddess. The one I remember was a lizard's head, one of the many symbols of fertility. This Mother-goddess of Ur is not at all unique, she has hundreds and thousands of sisters all over the world. The oldest conceptions of divinity of which representations remain are in the shape of a woman: in the palaeolithic caves of France and Spain; in the extremely exciting excavations of Mohenjo-daro in the Indus Valley. The way in which men symbolize their imagination of divinity is surely based upon their ideas of what is powerful and important. Will we be misunderstood if we say: women must gain back so much influence in society that they can contribute to the co-operation with all that goodwill for peace and happiness which must have been the aim of the Mother-goddess?

NINA SPILLER

BOOK REVIEWS

ESTIMATING HOUSING NEEDS. By Alexander Block, pp. xi and 128, with foreword by Sir Patrick Abercrombie. The Architectural Press, 10/6.

In the first chapter of this interesting work the author quotes several estimates of housing needs for the period from 1931-1941. Sir Ernest Simon, a housing expert with progressive views, estimated the dwelling deficiency in 1931 at 830,000 and the increase in families in the ten-year period 1931-1941 at 750,000. Other representative estimates varied above or below these figures. During the period from 1931 until the outbreak of war accommodation available increased by over two million dwellings (Block's own estimate is 2,182,000), yet the demand for accommodation was just as strong at the end of this period as at the beginning. Block gives the figure of 250,000 applications for accommodation made to the London County Council for the year ending March, 1938.

Where shall we seek for the apparent discrepancy between output and demand? The answer is that housing standards and demands are based upon cultural and economic factors and that there can be no absolute assessment of needs. Block makes the distinction between shelter and privacy in assessing housing needs. But, to take an extreme view of the matter, housing is not needed for shelter and it is a sign of a certain standard of living to demand a house even for collective occupation. Block cites Leningrad during the period between 1917-1923 to show the dependence of housing requirements upon general economic conditions. Not only did the population of the city decrease, but there was also a drastic reduction in the number of buildings. No doubt there were sufficient people left adequately to occupy all the buildings, but the economic conditions were such that the occupation of them all was not practicable. Apart from the purely economic aspect there is a development in the consciousness for more individual living. With the raising of the cultural level comes the demand for privacy.

So we get the position that it is not possible to estimate total requirements, with the consequence that we can only link the building programme with the general economic programme. If we can plan successfully for an expansion of our national economy we can expand the supply of housing accommodation and still face a housing shortage at any given time. But if for any reason (inability to obtain raw materials) our economy contracts, the demand for additional housing will contract. There is, too, apart from the general level of industry, the problem of fuel. If we became permanently unable to get a sufficiency of fuel there might well come a

demand to contract living accommodation and the number of separate dwelling units.

If it is not possible to estimate total housing needs, or to supply those needs could an estimate be made, it is still worth while studying the relative needs of different types of users. Having planned for as large an output of housing accommodation as will fit in with the national economy as a whole, it is necessary to see what types of households will be required. Block makes a plea for closer studies of differentiation than have heretofore been made. He quotes figures of municipal building programmes to show that the room units supplied bear no relation to the demand for accommodation as a whole, the major part of municipal building being of the three bedroom type of dwelling. The author seems unaware that this was a deliberate policy to favour persons with from middling to large families. The same policy is being pursued to-day by municipalities; the person who sets his heart upon obtaining a council dwelling will find three or four children a desirable asset.

Setting aside this fact that the allocation of dwellings is part of a social policy with further ends in view than the mere supply of required accommodation, viz., attempted determination of the birth-rate, there seem to be overwhelming difficulties in assessing relative housing needs determined by the ebb and flow of the birthrate. A person does not normally require a separate dwelling until the age twenty-plus, and this is good forewarning of the approximate number of dwelling units that may be required at a particular time, but the requirements dependent upon the size of the family that will be produced is an incalculable factor.

If the municipality is in future to be the main source of the supply of housing, instead of an auxiliary to private building as before the war, policy will have to include some provision for the person who has not got a family of from three to six children. However socially undesirable the one or two person unit may be considered (and a proportion of these units will be old people with perhaps exemplary records in the exercise of the reproductory function), some provision will have to be made for them. And it will be a good thing if the local housing authorities are forced in this way to provide a varied pattern of occupancy, instead of repeating their production of the pre-war municipal slum, in defiance of the accepted principles of neighbourhood planning, which is still to be seen on any number of the new estates in building to-day.

The study which Mr. Block is developing should lead to reasoned policies supplementing the good work that has been done on the technical and idealizing sides of planning. Indeed, it is a logical development of the planning movement, in line with the studies which are being carried out by the regional staffs of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning.

M. L. BURNET

ENGLAND'S GREEN AND PLEASANT LAND. By J. W. Robertson Scott. Penguin Books; viii, 183; 1s.

Mr. Robertson Scott, who retired this year from *The Countryman*, which he founded twenty-five years ago, rounds off this period of fine, creative journalism by reprinting with three additional chapters a book published twenty-three years ago based on some twenty-four articles contributed to the *Nation*. "The best thing since Cobbett," said Mr. Lloyd George at the time. The tribute was deserved. This collection stands as nothing else in our time can claim to stand in a tradition which descends from Langland. This achievement of the author does not mean that he has been looking at literary models, but on the contrary that he has looked at the things on which he has reported and has cared about what he saw.

Mr. Robertson Scott, then, is a moralist of this penetrating, painstaking lineage. He is not deceived. He sees squires, farmers, parsons, labourers, and the newcomers to the countryside for what they are worth, because he measures them, and takes pains to measure them accurately, by their works, not taking them by conventional standards or at their own valuation; for in the country the common life is made directly by those who live there. Those who live to themselves or for themselves are conspicuous, and made more conspicuous by neighbours of a different mould, like Mr. Robertson Scott himself who, because of his long years of patient precept and example in the practice of rural citizenship, understands what are the possibilities and conditions of rural civilization, and is able to see with the eye of a realist (not optimistic, but idealistic) the men and women on whom it depends. The strength of his position, which distinguishes him from such a contemporary countryman as Mr. Massingham, is that he is not looking backwards to an idealized golden age of the English countryside. He accepts and welcomes the new farming and the developments which may be summed up as scientific progress: they contribute largely to his hope for England's rural civilization. At the same time he is not satisfied not to look beyond material betterment. His concern is with men and women and the quality of the life which they make together. He is truly a moralist, and consciously he does not employ the statistical method of the sociologist but follows the older personal study of a sample, a sample of persons, with interpretative references to conditions and systems.

The system which haunts his reflections is the Church of England, naturally enough when one considers the relation of the pretensions and opportunities of the church to the core of the author's concern. Time and again, he returns to the pitiful personal inadequacy of the clergy, and the more culpable inadequacy of the church in clinging to the obsolete. How long will the

people be patient in leaving in the hands of such blind guides and useless ministers the parish churches which are their most valuable inheritance, sanctified by inherent beauty, antiquity, and the memory of their fathers: that is his persistent reflection. In the additional chapters, after remarking upon the incredible advances which have been made in the quarter century since the first publication of the book, he returns to the question of whether anything can be expected from the church, whether those who govern ecclesiastical affairs will really turn from the obsolete and the obsolescent and concentrate upon the job of helping people to live effective, worth-while lives. He feels no assurance of the affirmative answer which he desires, and looks more hopefully to the schools and to the new opportunities of cultural development. Those of us who agree with a friendly critic that in exposing the shortcomings of the church he is flogging a dead horse will wish that he had turned his mind more fully to the new agencies which will do what the church has failed to do. The call for a new reformation is vain. Yet possible the primacy of his moral concern and the painstaking fair-mindedness which gives quality and tradition to the book required his preoccupation with the church and the feelings which inform his attitude.

In conclusion, we are glad to have this opportunity of congratulating the author upon his achievement, and of thanking him for years of public-spirited devotion to promoting the quality of English rural life, with an eye for real causes and real hopes most rare in a moralist and a countryman.

H.J.B.

STATES AND MORALS. By T. D. Weldon, pp. 302. John Murray, 9/-.

The author examines in detail different forms of government and the political theories underlying them and comes to the conclusion that no logical case can be made out for the supremacy of either of the two main types of government, the organic (that is, the authoritarian), and the democratic, and that each is equally respectable. The holding of one type of view or another as to the nature of public institutions is determined by historical and cultural factors, but cannot be readily altered by education.

From the practical point of view, in the consideration of changing a nation from the holding of one theory of government to another, the author is right in being very sceptical. If you take a German boy not above the age of 11 and bring him up in a democratic country he is likely to absorb the culture of that country and to accept the political conventions current there. Nothing comparable can be done with a nation, its views are not to be changed by a few sermons delivered by foreigners.

Weldon takes the view on the practical issue of the day, the East-West conflict, that hostilities can be avoided by the applica-

tion of forbearance and toleration. The main thing is that first principles should not be discussed, but the differences on them taken for granted, and it will then be possible to get down to relations on the plane of secondary principles. There is a great danger of animosities taking on the nature of a religious war between East and West. Weldon refers to the fact that European civilization was preserved despite the conflict between Rome and the Protestant churches. The recipe for peace is restraint from provocation and mutual acceptance of sacrifices on all non-essential matters. On the first-principle level, though, we must not attempt to reach an understanding, as this will only exacerbate feelings, but should realize on the contrary that there is no common ground. Weldon refers to the fact that two men will do business with one another to the mutual advantage of both without the holding of identical views on moral questions.

Regarded simply as an issue between the two different conceptions of government, it is no doubt true that peace could be maintained with their existence side by side. The United States is not likely to make war on the Argentine over a question of forms of government. The internal stability of régimes is a far more potent factor in the determination of peace and war. M. L. BURNET

CORRESPONDENCE

Religion and the Child

I think that much of the difficulty in this connection is due to the fact that many parents worry too much about what other people tell their children, and do not concentrate sufficiently on teaching them their own views. Everyone is bound to encounter some wrong teaching, on religion as on other subjects, and if a child has the right background, this matters very little. Parents cannot tell their children too often what they themselves believe (without insisting that they are infallible); this, and the possession of good modern children's books on nature and science, especially on astronomy and geology, will prepare a child's mind to withstand any amount of superstitious propaganda.

If a child is brought up in this way, and told often enough what his parents believe, his entry to school and consequent attendance at prayers should have no adverse effect on him; parents should, however, tell the teacher how the child has been brought up, and should not leave him to find this out from the child himself.

Lastly, I would advise all parents to obtain a copy of *The Listener* or the *Literary Guide*, containing Bertrand Russell's broadcast, "*What I Believe*," and to keep this until their children are old

enough for more definite guidance; it is the clearest and most dignified expression of a rationalist's faith that I have yet encountered, and should be a great help to those who find it difficult to put their thoughts into words. L. M. M. BEADNELL

A Challenge to Humanism

That *Puzzled People* presents such a challenge, as the Editor suggests in the July issue of *The Plain View*, there is no doubt. His commentary on the results of this investigation raises some vital issues which the Ethical Movement needs to consider thoroughly and urgently.

What is the heart of the matter? It can, of course be variously expressed but it may be simply put as: a community drifting; not entirely without a moral compass but with an outworn steering gear in which only a small minority has confidence. There is not only no recognized captain or organised crew but a bewildering medley of ineffective advisers who argue as to the course to be pursued. The analogy might be elaborated, but its essential point is the plight of the community, the absence of a common faith in its destiny. What in all this is the challenge to us as Humanists? I think it resides in several facts of the situation. We have claimed that the Christian Churches have failed and we trace their failure to their supernatural dogmas. Can we, with our rational interpretation of life, succeed? The confusion through religious sectarianism we attribute to similar irrational causes. Will our view of life and duty seem clear and unifying to a bewildered people? We note cynicism and moral apathy. How far does our religion dispose men to enthusiasm and active service in its cause. The view appears to be held by some that the Ethical Movement must inevitably remain a small body of intellectuals, undertaking research into particular ethical problems or discussing such research, and endeavouring to exercise a vague pervasive influence on religious thought (much as the Fabian Society has done in British politics), but not at all attempting to reach the common people or to offer them any active or direct help in their religious life. To such a view, *Puzzled People* may appear an interesting statistical study but no challenge.

There is, of course, a very real sense in which deep and thorough understanding of ethical problems is a specialized task which only a few can undertake. But it is equally true that only a general appreciation by the mass of the people of the principles at stake can elicit that intelligent co-operation and moral fervour which is needed to regenerate society. This does not necessarily imply a mass movement, but it does mean a broad based movement speaking the

language of the people. Mr. Blackham says in his preface to *Puzzled People*: "The creation of faith in democracy is not less urgent than the creation of faith in purposive living." The two things are linked: they both involve a large scale change in popular values. The questions arise: Do we believe that the essentials of Humanism can be presented in such simple and attractive terms as, for example, the gospel of Jesus was? Do we, who have criticised the narrow separatism of the churches believe that we have a religion of universal appeal and unifying effect? It is such a message as this that our generation, disheartened by nationalist, sectarian, and class disruptions, needs above all.

While saying this, I am deeply conscious of the limits of our immediately practicable endeavours. I can speak only from a limited experience of ethical propaganda, but it has the interest of widely separated times: some years in West London about 30 years ago, and more recently in my present home town. There is no question in my mind as to the greatly increased difficulty of the task nowadays. Denominational virility and belief in something, however irrational, was pretty general in the former period and one was usually paid the respect of either opposition or support, varying from lukewarm to active. To-day it is not only the mass indifference to these issues which appals me. The most painful truth is that thousands of people who are *intellectually* convinced of the soundness of our position are unwilling to join us or stir a finger to advance our cause, because they have either lost or never acquired any dynamic faith in Humanism.

It is relevant at this point to draw attention to the two movements, Rationalist and Ethical, which, while possessing much in common still pursue independent courses, and to ask whether some of the negative iconoclasm, a necessary phase in earlier days, does not too strongly characterize the former and still influence the latter. Rationalism is essential *as a method*, but many of its adherents fail to see that it is even more important to decide on the *ends* for which the method is to be employed. Ethical Religion or Humanism is something more vital and fundamental than a technique of approach. It is concerned with men's aims and conduct in all the relations of personal and social life. The questions we as Humanists have to ask ourselves are how, when, and to what extent that concern is to be manifest; and the central point is how deep is that concern. Does Humanism inspire us to such service, or is it a mere fact or opinion, like the colours of the spectrum or an economic trend.

Upon the answers to these questions depends not only our estimate of our strength and possible achievements, but whether in fact we undertake these large tasks. Our small membership and limited

resources will obviously restrict any immediate influence to that of a small energizing minority. But have we no allies? Last year saw a significant development in Humanism which should give us some encouragement—the Humanist Conference with its useful collaboration with kindred societies and fellow travellers at home and abroad. The nucleus for a wider Humanist movement is there: can it not be increased in size, better organized, energized into greater activity, and inspired to a larger purpose? While we must necessarily be primarily concerned with our duties and responsibilities in our own country, we should certainly not leave out of account the importance of developing our international contacts and of emphasizing the universal character of Humanism. There is, in particular, the potentiality of much closer co-operation with the American Humanist Movement, with which we have had such mutually helpful association in the past. There are groups in Europe and elsewhere in the world, with whom closer contacts, in the hope of an eventual truly international movement, might well be fostered. Ideas not only have legs but power, and the sharing of a great world-wide purpose might well add to the zeal with which we tackle our national responsibilities.

There are, perhaps, other less obvious potential allies. *Puzzled People* reminds us that there are thousands of men and women who join or remain in the Christian churches, not from any faith in its theological or supernatural teachings, but for a similar reason to that which attracts us to an Ethical Society—the desire for moral fellowship. They are as worried about the moral apathy and aimless lives of the people as we are. Can we not devise any point of contact or means of co-operation with these good friends? We have been compelled to adopt a critical and seemingly negative attitude to the Christian Churches because of the weakening and confusion of moral responsibility arising from their supernaturalism, but there remains a large field of possible joint effort on the practical ethical plane with individuals or with groups who are ready for such co-operation. The fine international reputation earned by the Society of Friends by the simple and persistent practice of its ideals is a relevant thought. While the approach to elements in the Christian, Jewish and other churches is obviously much more difficult than to Rationalists, who are already very close to us, nevertheless until we have considered and explored such possible co-operation we cannot say it is either undesirable or impossible.

Many, if not all, these suggestions, are for long-term development. The short term programme must be for the Ethical Union itself to adjust its mind and practice to the situation sharply focussed in *Puzzled People*. Already, as though in anticipation, much useful work has been done in the past few years in the pre-

paration of more popular literature, in the organization of conferences on matters where social life and ethics most obviously intermingle, and in the preliminary feeling of the way in thought towards a larger view of the Union's task. What is now wanted is a quickening of the tempo, a deeper sense of mission, and a greater concentration of the practical measures immediately needed to increase our strength. More leaflets, more effective publicity, more popular meetings and a larger and more representative membership are among the latter. We shall neither attain nor need a mass membership to exert the sort of influence that is herein indicated, but we most emphatically should aim at a membership sufficiently large and a type of local organization sufficiently simple and attractive to enable ordinary people to feel they "belong" to a great national movement for fundamental well being.

The Ethical Movement may itself suffer in some degree from the prevalent sense of frustration and disillusion, and its age composition is a factor adverse to adventure, enthusiasm and energy. Many of us, including the writer, may well doubt our capacity for such formidable tasks as those which have been suggested. But the challenge which has come is no escapable matter of mere words: to an *ethical* movement it is a test of sincerity and conviction. We may as individuals lay stress on this or that particular aspect of the matter, but no Humanist can disregard the claim of puzzled people to such enlightenment and moral inspiration as he can give.

J. HENRY LLOYD.

NEWS

At meetings of the Council of L'Union Mondiale des Libres Penseurs held in Amsterdam in September, it was decided to hold a full international Congress next year in Rome, at which the main topics of discussion would be: Vatican policy; ecclesiastical control of education; humanism and freethought.

The British Section has arranged a conference which will be held in Birmingham, October 24-26, 1947. There will be a social gathering and four sessions: (1) The Secular Basis of Morality; (2) The World Policy of the Church of Rome; (3) Where Rome Rules; (4) The Humanist Contribution to Civilization. Full information may be obtained from the Ethical Union.

